We propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D'Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is based on maximizing the support of the least supported elected candidate. It can be computed efficiently and satisfies (adjusted versions of) the main properties of the original D'Hondt method: house monotonicity, population monotonicity, and proportional representation. We also establish a close relationship between the maximin support method and Phragmén's voting rules.
Introduction
Decision making based on the aggregation of possibly conflicting preferences is a central problem in the field of social choice and has received a considerable amount of attention from the artificial intelligence research community [Conitzer, 2010; Brandt et al., 2016; Sandholm, 1999; Skowron et al., 2015; Aziz et al., 2017; Elkind et al., , 2011 Betzler et al., 2013] . A voting system takes as input the preferences of agents over a set of candidates, and outputs one or several candidates as the collective choice. We study multiwinner elections, where a subset of candidates of a fixed size needs to be selected.
Multiwinner elections are often used in scenarios in which it is desirable that the set of selected candidates represents different opinions or preferences of the electorate. For instance, this is the case in parliamentary elections.
Representative multiwinner voting rules can also be applied in multiagent systems. For instance, consider the scenario in which a group of friends usually goes to the cinema one or several times a week. 1 Suppose that this group of friends selects the set of movies that they are going to watch within a certain time period (for instance, a month) using a multiwinner voting rule. 2 In this scenario, if a minority of the members of the group have different tastes from the majority, the minority may demand that a proportion of the movies (proportional to the size of the minority) is selected from the movies the minority likes.
Another, completely different, example is the selection of teachers for a school. 3 Suppose that a school has to hire a number of teachers. All the classes in the school have the same size. The school director decides to run an election to select the teachers, in which parents have to give their preferences with respect to the candidates that have applied for the teacher positions. 4 In this scenario, the ideal situation is to select and assign teachers in such a way that all the parents like the teacher assigned to their childrens class. Therefore, it does not matter if a teacher is only liked by a small minority of the parents, as long as this minority consists of the parents of the children that are assigned to this teacher.
Other examples of scenarios in which it is necessary to select a number of candidates or choices that are representative of the preferences of a group of agents have been discussed by Skowron et al. [2016] , by Lu and Boutilier [2011] , and by .
One of the basic characteristics of a multiwinner voting rule is the way in which agents (voters) cast their votes. Two alternatives are commonly used: 1) ranked ballots, in which agents have to provide a total order of the candidates; and 2) approval ballots, in which agents simply approve as many candidates as they like. One of the advantages of approval ballots compared to ranked ballots is the simplicity of the ballots [Laslier and Sanver, 2010] .
In this study, we propose an approval-based multiwinner voting rule that can be used in scenarios in which it is necessary to select a representative set of winners. Our voting rule, which we call the maximin support method, is an extension of the well known D'Hondt method of apportionment (in the USA, the latter is also known as Jefferson's method) to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is inspired by the defining property of the D'Hondt method: D'Hondt selects a set of winners that maximizes the support of the least supported winner (a detailed explanation of this concept will be provided later).
Together with seq-Phragmén, 5 the maximin support method is the first polynomial-time computable methods that is known to satisfy proportional justified representation (PJR), a representation axiom proposed by . Moreover, like the D'Hondt method, the maximin support method also satisfies (adjusted versions of) house monotonicity and population monotonicity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the main notations and symbols used throughout the paper. Section 3 reviews the D'Hondt method of apportionment, and Section 4 introduces the concept of support distributions, on which the new method is based. The maximin support method is defined in Section 5 and its axiomatic properties are analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 compares the maximin support method with other extensions of the D'Hondt method, and Section 8 concludes.
5 seq-Phragmén was proposed by the Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragmén [Phragmén, 1894 [Phragmén, , 1895 [Phragmén, , 1896 [Phragmén, , 1899 in the 19th century. In simultaneous and independent work to ours, proved that seq-Phragmén satisfies PJR and can be computed in polynomial time.
Preliminaries
Let C be a finite set of candidates and N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n voters. Furthermore, k denotes the number of winners to be selected. We assume 1 ≤ k ≤ |C| and n ≥ 1.
For each i ∈ N, we let A i ⊆ C denote the approval ballot of voter i. That is, A i is the subset of candidates that voter i approves of. A ballot profile is a list A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) of approval ballots, one for each voter i ∈ N. An approval-based multiwinner election can thus be represented by a tuple (N, C, A, k).
An (approval-based multiwinner) voting rule R is a function that maps an election σ = (N, C, A, k) to a set R(σ) ⊆ C of |R(σ)| = k candidates, interpreted as the winners of σ according to rule R. During the execution of a voting rule, ties between candidates can occur. We assume that ties are broken using a fixed priority ordering over the universe of all possible candidates. For example, the priority ordering could be the lexicographic order, and this is the one we use in our examples.
An important subdomain of approval-based multiwinner elections is defined by party-list elections, where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties and voters can vote for exactly one party. Formally, a party-list election satisfies C = P 1 ∪P 2 ∪. . .∪P p and every approval ballot A i coincides with one party list P j . The ballot profile for a party-list election can be summarized 6 by a vote vector V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v p ), where v j is the number of votes for party P j (i.e., v j = |{i ∈ N : A i = P j }|). An apportionment method takes as input a vote vector V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v p ) and a natural number k and outputs a seat distribution x = (x 1 , . . . , x p ) ∈ N p 0 with p j=1 x i = k. The interpretation is that party P j is allocated x j seats. Apportionment methods have been extensively studied in the literature [Balinski and Young, 1975; Pukelsheim, 2014] . Since the party-list setting is a special case of the general approvalbased multiwinner setting, every approval-based multiwinner rule induces an apportionment method [Brill et al., 2018 ]. An approval-based multiwinner rule is called an extension of an apportionment method if it induces it. In this paper, we will introduce a novel extension of the apportionment method due to D'Hondt.
Review of the D'Hondt Apportionment Method
The D'Hondt method (aka Jefferson method ) is a particular example from a family of apportionment methods known as divisor methods [Farrell, 2011; Balinski and Young, 1975; Pukelsheim, 2014] . These methods assign seats to parties based on a sequence of divisors (d 1 , d 2 , d 3 , . . .), and different divisor methods differ in their choice of this sequence. Divisor methods can be illustrated by constructing a table in which columns correspond to parties and rows correspond to divisors. The entry in row i and column j is given by v j /d i , i.e., the number of votes of party P j divided by the i-th divisor. The divisor method then assigns the k seats to the parties corresponding to the k highest quotients in this table. The D'Hondt method is defined via the divisor sequence (d 1 , d 2 , d 3 , . . .) = (1, 2, 3, . . . ). An example of the use of the D'Hondt method is shown in Table 1, where five seats must be assigned to three parties: P 1 (composed of candidates a 1 , . . . , a 5 ), P 2 (composed of candidates b 1 , . . . , b 5 ), and P 3 (composed of candidates c 1 , . . . , c 5 ). As shown in Table 1 , the D'Hondt method assigns three seats to party P 1 , one to party P 2 , and one to party P 3 . Using the lexicographic order to break ties among candidates of the same party, the set of elected candidates is {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , b 1 , c 1 }.
Votes (v j ) 5 100 3 150 1 750 Seats (x j ) 3 1 1 Table 1 : Example of the use of the D'Hondt method. The k = 5 highest quotients are marked in bold and correspond to the seat distribution (3, 1, 1).
Divisors
An important proportionality axiom for apportionment methods is lower quota, which requires that each party P j is allocated at least ⌊k v j n ⌋ seats. It is well known that the D'Hondt method is the only divisor method satisfying lower quota [di Cortona et al., 1999; Balinski and Young, 1975] . Moreover, the D'Hondt method satisfies house monotonicity and population monotonic-ity (see Section 6 for definitions of these properties).
A Formal Model for the Concept of Support
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of support, on which our extension of the D'Hondt method will be based. One way of viewing the D'Hondt apportionment method is to consider that a vote received by a party is distributed among the elected candidates from that party. For instance, in the example illustrated in Table 1 , each of the three elected candidates from party P 1 is supported by 5100/3 = 1700 voters, the elected candidate from list party P 2 is supported by 3150 voters, and the elected candidate from party P 3 is supported by 1750 voters. By definition, the D'Hondt method chooses a seat distribution that maximizes the support of the least supported candidate [di Cortona et al., 1999] . (For instance, assigning two seats to party P 2 would mean that those two candidates have a support of only 1575 voters.)
We now generalize this notion to the setting of approval-based multiwinner elections, by distributing votes in the form of approval ballots among the elected candidates. A natural condition is that the vote of a voter can only be distributed among those candidates that are approved by that voter. In general, there may be many different ways of distributing votes, leading to different support values for candidates. We now present a formal model of support without fixing any particular way of distributing the votes.
For an approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N, C, A, k) and a nonempty subset D ⊆ C of candidates, we define the family F σ,D of support distribution functions as the set of all functions that distribute support among the candidates in D. Formally, F σ,D consists of all functions f :
For each voter i ∈ N, f (i, c) is the fraction of voter i's vote that is "assigned" to candidate c. Note that the definition requires that f (i, c) = 0 whenever c / ∈ A i . Thus, the vote of a voter is distributed only among those candidates that are approved by that voter. Given a support distribution function f ∈ F σ,D and a candidate c ∈ D, we let supp f (c) denote the total support received by c under f , i.e., supp f (c) = i∈N f (i, c).
Approval ballot Votes
{c 1 , c 2 } 10 000 {c 1 , c 3 } 6 000 {c 2 } 4 000 {c 3 } 5 500 {c 4 } 9 500 {c 5 , c 6 , c 7 } 5 000 {c 5 } 3 000 Example 1. Consider the election σ 1 = (N, C, A, k) with k = 3 and C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 , c 7 }. There are n = 43000 voters and the ballot profile is shown in Table 2 . Consider the subset D = {c 1 , c 3 , c 5 } and let f be the
. Thus, f assigns 2400 out of the 6000 {c 1 , c 3 }-votes to c 1 and the remaining 3600 {c 1 , c 3 }-votes to c 3 , resulting in the following support values.
f (i, c 1 ) = 10 000 + 2 400 = 12 400
f (i, c 5 ) = 5 000 + 3 000 = 8 000
The Maximin Support Method
We now propose an extension of the D'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections. It is based on the same principle as the D'Hondt method, in that the support for the least supported elected candidates should be as large as possible. We therefore refer to this novel method as maximin support method (MMS ). The maximin support method chooses candidates sequentially until the desired number k of candidates have been selected. In every iteration, a candidate with the greatest support is chosen, under the condition that only support distribution functions maximizing the support for the least supported candidate are considered.
In order to formally define the method, we need the following notation.
For an approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N, C, A, k) and a nonempty candidate subset D ⊆ C, let maximin(σ, D) denote the maximal support for the least supported candidate in D, where the maximum is taken over all support distribution functions in F σ,D . Formally,
Furthermore, we let F opt σ,D denote the nonempty 7 set of support distribution functions that maximize the support for the least supported candidate in D for election σ, i.e.,
σ,D are called optimal support distribution functions. We are now ready to present the maximin support method. Given an approval-based multiwinner election σ, the set W = MMS (σ) is determined by starting with W = ∅ and iteratively adding candidates until |W | = k. In each iteration, we add to W the unelected candidate receiving the greatest support, under the condition that only optimal support distributions functions are considered. 8 More precisely, for each candidate c ∈ C \ W , we compute an optimal support distribution function f c for the set W ∪ {c} and determine the total support supp fc (c) that c receives under f c . The candidate maximizing this value is then added to W . The procedure is formally described in Algorithm 1.
Since the set F opt σ,W ∪{c} of optimal support distribution functions may contain more than one function, the value of s c = supp fc (c) could potentially depend on the choice of f c ∈ F opt σ,W ∪{c} . The following result implies that this is not the case.
Theorem 1. Let σ = (N, C, A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election. The following holds for each j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Let W j denote the set of the first j candidates chosen by the maximin support method when applied to σ. Then, for each candidate c ∈ C \ W j and for each optimal support distribution function
Since F σ,D may be an infinite set, we need to make sure that the function min c∈D supp f (c) attains a maximum over this set. We will see in the proof of Theorem 2 that the corresponding optimization problem can be formulated as a feasible and bounded linear program. It follows that F opt σ,D = ∅ and that max f ∈Fσ,D min c∈D supp f (c) indeed exists.
8 Restricting attention to optimal support distribution functions ensures that support for previously elected candidates is not ignored when searching for new support distribution function; see also Theorem 1.
Theorem 1, whose proof can be found in A, states that in every iteration the candidate c added to W is among the least supported candidates under every optimal support distribution function. The support of this candidate thus equals maximin(σ, W ∪ {c}), which (by definition) is independent of the particular f c ∈ F opt σ,W ∪{c} that was chosen in line 6 of the algorithm. This result gives rise to an interesting alternative formulation of the maximin support method. In this equivalent formulation, there is no need to choose an optimal support distribution function from F opt σ,W ∪{c} ; rather, s c is directly defined as maximin(σ, W ∪ {c}). A natural interpretation of this definition is that the value s c measures the effect that the addition of a potential candidate would have on the maximal support for the least supported candidate.
The next theorem establishes that the maximin support method can be computed efficiently.
Theorem 2. The maximin support method can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that, for any subset D ⊆ C of candidates, an optimal support distribution function f ∈ F opt σ,D can be computed in polynomial time. For a given approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N, C, A, k) and a D ⊆ C, consider the following linear program, containing a variable f (i, c) for each i ∈ N and c ∈ A i ∩ D, and an additional variable s.
The first set of constraints require that the support for the least supported candidate in D is at least s, while the remaining constraints ensure that the variables f (i, c) encode a valid support distribution function. 9 Therefore, optimal solutions of this linear program correspond to optimal support distribution functions. Since linear programming problems can be solved in polynomial time [Khachian, 1979] , this concludes the proof.
We conclude this section by illustrating the maximin support method with an example.
Example 2. Consider again the election σ 1 from Example 1. In the first step (j = 1), the value s c = maximin(σ 1 , {c}) equals the approval score of candidate c, i.e., s c = |{i ∈ N : c ∈ A i }| for all c ∈ C. Therefore, the approval winner c 1 (with s c 1 = 16000) is chosen. The corresponding support distribution function f satisfies f (i, c 1 ) = 1 for all i ∈ N with c 1 ∈ A i .
In the second step (j = 2), we have W = {c 1 } and we need to compute the value s x = maximin(σ 1 , {c 1 , x}) for every x ∈ C \ {c 1 }. For example, for candidate c 2 we get s c 2 = maximin(σ 1 , {c 1 , c 2 }) = 10000; the corresponding support distribution function f assigns 4000 out of the 10000 {c 1 , c 2 }-votes to c 1 and the remaining 6000 to c 2 . A better value is achieved by candidate c 3 . The support distribution realizing s c 3 = maximin(σ 1 , {c 1 , c 3 }) = 10750 assigns all 10000 {c 1 , c 2 }-votes to c 1 , all 5500 {c 3 }-votes to c 3 , and divides the 6000 {c 1 , c 3 }-votes between c 1 and c 3 such that both candidates have a total support of 10750 each. Computing the other values, we get s c 4 = 9500, s c 5 = 8000, and s c 6 = s c 7 = 5000. Therefore, c 3 is selected as the second candidate.
In the third step (j = 3), we have W = {c 1 , c 3 } and we need to compute the value s x = maximin(σ 1 , {c 1 , c 3 , x}) for every x ∈ C \ {c 1 , c 3 }. It can be checked that s c 2 = 8500, s c 4 = 9500, s c 5 = 8000, and s c 6 = s c 7 = 5000. Thus, candidate c 4 is chosen. There are several support distribution functions
; each of them assigns all 9500 {c 4 }-votes to c 4 and distributes the 2500 votes containing c 1 or c 3 in such a way that c 1 and c 3 have a total support of at least 9500 each.
In summary, we have MMS (σ 1 ) = {c 1 , c 3 , c 4 }.
6 Axiomatic Properties of the Maximin Support Method
In this section, we show that the maximin support method is indeed an extension of the D'Hondt method, and that it satisfies (adjusted versions of) several important properties that the latter satisfies. In particular, we we show that the maximin support method satisfies house monotonicity, weak support monotonicity (a variant of population monotonicity), and proportional justified representation. The latter property generalizes the notion of lower quota to approval-based multiwinner elections.
D'Hondt Extension
We first show that the maximin support method coincides with the D'Hondt method in the party-list domain. Our approach is similar to that of Brill et al. [2018] .
Theorem 3. The maximin support method is an extension of the D'Hondt method.
Proof. Consider a party-list election σ = (N, C, A, k) with C = P 1 ∪ . . . ∪ P p and vote vector V = (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v p ) (i.e., v r = |{i ∈ N : A i = P r }|). Let W j be the set of the first j candidates chosen by MMS . Let c be a candidate in C − W j and let P r be the party to which c belongs. In Theorem 1 we proved that c will always be in the set of the least supported candidates when we maximize the support for the least supported candidate in W j ∪ {c}.
But c is approved only by the voters that approve all the candidates in P r , and no candidate in P r is approved of by any other voter. This means that maximizing the support of the least supported candidate in W j ∪ {c} depends only on the number v r of voters approving P r and on the number of candidates of P r that are in W j ∪ {c}. Therefore, the support for the least supported candidate is maximized if the total support v r of party P r is distributed uniformly among all the candidates in P r that are in W j ∪ {c} (any other distribution of the votes to P r would make one or several candidates in (W j ∪ {c}) ∩ P r receive less support), and
This is exactly the same calculation the D'Hondt method performs for selecting candidates, so both methods must assign the same number of seats to each party.
House Monotonicity
House monotonicity requires that all selected candidates are still selected when the number k of winners is increased.
Definition 1. An approval-based multiwinner voting rule R is house monotonic if, for any pair of elections σ = (N, C, A, k) and σ ′ = (N, C, A, k + 1), it holds that R(σ) ⊂ R(σ ′ ).
Since the maximin support method selects winners iteratively, house monotonicity is trivially satisfied.
Theorem 4. The maximin support method is house monotonic.
Support Monotonicity
The standard definition of population monotonicity requires that additional support for a candidate does not harm that candidate. For instance, the definition of candidate monotonicity given by when restricted to approval-based multi-winner elections leads to this notion of monotonicity. A natural extension of this idea has been proposed by by considering what happens when the support of several of the winners is increased. A first version of the axiom (referred by Sánchez-Fernández and Fisteus as weak support monotonicity) requires that, when the support of a subset of the winners is increased, at least one of those candidates must remain in the winning set.
Definition 2. An approval-based multiwinner voting rule R satisfies weak support monotonicity if the following statements hold for all approval-based multiwinner elections σ = (N, C, A, k) and for all nonempty subsets G ⊆ R(σ) of winning candidates:
1. (weak support monotonicity without population increase) Let i ∈ N be a voter with A i ∩G = ∅ and consider the election
2. (weak support monotonicity with population increase) Consider the
We note that this definition reduces to the standard definition of population monotonicity when |G| = 1, and thus, despite its name, weak support monotonicity is slightly stronger than the standard version of population monotonicity.
Theorem 5. The maximin support method is weak support monotonic.
Proof. First of all, we observe that for any nonempty candidate set X that is disjoint from G, the maximum support of the least supported candidate in X (when distributing the votes only between the candidates in X) is the same for σ, σ ′ , and σ ′′ . This is because the changes made in σ ′ and σ ′′ do not affect how the votes can be distributed between the candidates in X.
Let r be the MMS iteration in which the first candidate from G is elected in election σ and let c * ∈ G be such candidate. For 0 ≤ j ≤ k, let W j , W j σ ′ , and W j σ ′′ be the first j candidates chosen by MMS for elections σ, σ ′ , and σ ′′ .
) If at least one candidate from G is selected within the first (r−1) iterations of the execution of MMS for election σ ′ (respectively, for election σ ′′ ), the statement of the theorem holds. Therefore, we assume that in the first r − 1 iterations no candidate from G is selected for election σ ′ (respectively, for election σ ′′ ). In this case, at each iteration the candidate added to the set of winners will be the same for σ and σ ′ (respectively, σ and σ ′′ ) because the computation of maximin is done over sets of candidates disjoint from G.
We are going to prove that the candidate chosen at iteration r for election σ ′ (respectively, for election σ ′′ ) belongs to G. First, we observe that since W (r−1) ∩ G = ∅, for each candidate c ∈ C \ (W (r−1) ∪ G) the maximum support of the least supported candidate in W (r−1) ∪ {c} is the same for elections σ, σ ′ , and σ ′′ . It is therefore sufficient to prove that the maximum support of the least supported candidate in W (r−1) ∪ {c * } = W r for election σ ′ (respectively, for election σ ′′ ) is greater than or equal to the maximum support of the least supported candidate in W r for election σ. Further, it is enough to find a support distribution function g ∈ F σ ′ ,W r (respectively, a support distribution function h ∈ F σ ′′ ,W r ) such that for each candidate c in W r the support of c under g (respectively, the support of c under h) is greater than or equal to the maximum support of the least supported candidate in W r for election σ.
Consider any optimal support distribution function f ∈ F opt σ,W r . For election σ ′ we can define g as follows. If A i ∩W r = ∅, then let g(j, c) = f (j, c) for each voter j ∈ N and each candidate c ∈ W r . If voter i does not approve any of the candidates in W r in election σ (that is, if A i ∩ W r = ∅), then for each candidate c ∈ W r we have f (i, c) = 0. In that case we define g(j, c) = f (j, c) for each voter j ∈ N, j = i, and each candidate c ∈ W r , g(i, c * ) = 1, and g(i, c) = 0 for each candidate c ∈ W (r−1) .
For election σ ′′ , let h(j, c) = f (j, c) for each voter j ∈ N and each candidate c ∈ W r , h(n + 1, c * ) = 1, and h(n + 1, c) = 0 for each candidate c ∈ W (r−1) .
Clearly, each candidate in W r receives a support under g and h that is greater than or equal to the support that the same candidate receives under f . Moreover, since f ∈ F opt σ,W r , all candidates in W r receive a support under f that is greater than or equal to the support of the least supported candidate in W r for election σ.
Sánchez-Fernández and Fisteus [2017] also consider a stronger axiom called strong support monotonicity (with and without population increase) that requires that, if the support of a subset G of the winners is increased, all candidates in G must remain in the set of winners. The following example shows that MMS does not satisfy this stronger requirement.
Example 3. Consider the election σ 2 = (N, C, A, k) with k = 6 and C = {a, b, c 1 , . . . , c 5 }. There are 18 voters casting the following ballots: 13 voters approve of {c 1 , . . . , c 5 }, 2 voters approve of {a, b}, 2 voters approve of {a}, and 1 voter approves of {b}. For this election, we have MMS (σ 2 ) = {a, c 1 , . . . , c 5 } (candidate a is elected in the fourth iteration). If a new voter enters the election and approves of precisely {a, c 1 , . . . , c 5 }, then the sets of winners outputted by MMS is {a, b, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 } (candidate a is now elected in the third iteration while candidate b is elected in the last one). This example proves that MMS violates strong support monotonicity with population increase.
To prove that MMS violates strong support monotonicity without population increase, we modify σ 2 by adding a new candidate d and a new voter approving of {d}. Let σ 3 denote this modified election. It is easy to check that MMS (σ 3 ) = MMS (σ 2 ) = {a, c 1 , . . . , c 5 }. If the new voter changes his approval set to {a, c 1 , . . . , c 5 , d}, then the set of MMS winners is again given by {a, b, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 }.
We stress that other axioms related to population monotonicity could be defined in addition to the two cases that we are considering in this paper. One example could be that one voter changes her vote and no longer approves of a certain candidate c that was in the set of winners and a new voter enters the election and approves only candidate c.
Proportional Representation
Finally, we consider axiomatic properties concerning the proportional representation of voter groups. In particular, we will consider two axioms that have recently been proposed: proportional justified representation (PJR) and extended justified representation (EJR) [Aziz et al., 2017] . Both PJR and EJR are generalizations of the lower quota axiom (see Section 3) to the general approval-based multiwinner setting: if a voting rule satisfies PJR or EJR, then its induced apportionment method satisfies lower quota [Brill et al., 2018] .
In order to define PJR and EJR, we need some terminology. Let σ = (N, C, A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election. Given a positive integer ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we say that a subset N * ⊆ N of voters is ℓ-cohesive if |N * | ≥ ℓ n k and | i∈N * A i | ≥ ℓ. A subset D ⊆ C of candidates provides proportional justified representation for σ (σ-PJR) if for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all ℓ-cohesive subsets N * ⊆ N, it holds that
(1)
And D provides extended justified representation for σ (σ-EJR) if for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and all ℓ-cohesive subsets N * ⊆ N, there exists a voter i ∈ N * with |A i ∩ D| ≥ ℓ.
(2)
Definition 3. An approval-based multiwinner voting rule R satisfies proportional justified representation (PJR) (respectively, extended justified representation (EJR)) if R(σ) provides σ-PJR (respectively, σ-EJR) for every approval-based multiwinner election σ.
Since (2) implies (1), every rule satisfying EJR also satisfies PJR.
Theorem 6. The maximin support method satisfies proportional justified representation.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there exists an election σ = (N, C, A, k) and an ℓ-cohesive group N * ⊆ N such that for the set W = MMS (σ) of winners output by the maximin support method we have |W ∩ ( i∈N * A i )| < ℓ. Thus, there are x > k − ℓ candidates in W that are not approved of by any voter in N * , and therefore, the support of some of these x candidates (and the maximum support of the least supported candidate in W ) has to be strictly less than n k (to see why, observe that
. By Theorem 1, at each iteration the candidate that is added to the set of winners is one of the least supported when we maximize the support of the least supported candidate in the current set of winners. Therefore, at the last iterations of MMS for election σ the support of the candidate that we add to the set of winners when we maximize the support of the least supported candidate is strictly less than n k (this happens for sure at least in the last iteration).
Let j be the first iteration of MMS for election σ such that the maximum support of the least supported candidate in W is less than n k and let c be the candidate elected in such iteration. Let c * be a candidate that is approved of by all the voters in N * and that does not belong to W (such candidate exists because | i∈N * A i | ≥ ℓ but |W ∩ ( i∈N * A i )| < ℓ). Since all the voters in N * approve c * and there are at most ℓ − 1 candidates in W that are approved by some voters in N * , if we add candidate c * to the set of winners instead of candidate c at iteration j, the support of c * when we maximize the support of the least supported candidate would be at least |N * | ℓ (observe that if some of the candidates in W that are approved by some voters in N * had a support greater than |N * | ℓ we could iteratively pick each of such candidates and give the surplus coming from voters in N * to c * ). Observe now that |N * | ℓ ≥ ℓ n k ℓ = n k , and therefore candidate c * would be elected ahead of candidate c at iteration j, a contradiction.
The following example shows that the maximin support method does not satisfy the stronger axiom EJR.
Example 4. Consider election σ 4 = (N, C, A, k) with k = 4 and C = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 }. There are 16 voters casting the following ballots: 5 voters approve of {a 1 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 }, 4 voters approve of {a 2 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 }, 3 voters approve of {a 3 , c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 }, 2 voters approve of {a 1 }, one voter approves of {a 2 }, and one voter approves of {a 3 }.
The set of winners according to the maximin support method is given by MMS (σ 4 ) = {c 1 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } (selected in this order). The 12 voters whose approval set contains {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 } form a 3-cohesive group, but none of these voters approves at least 3 candidates in the set of winners. Therefore, MMS (σ 4 ) fails to provide σ 4 -EJR, which implies that MMS does not satisfy EJR.
Comparison With Other D'Hondt Extensions
The maximin support method is not the only way to extend the D'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections. In this section we are going to compare the maximin support method with other extensions of the D'Hondt method. In particular, we will consider two classes of rules, both of which originated in Scandinavia in the 1890s. The first class of rules was proposed by the Swedish mathematician Lars Edvard Phragmén [Phragmén, 1894 [Phragmén, , 1895 [Phragmén, , 1896 [Phragmén, , 1899 and the second class of rules was proposed by the Danish polymath Thorvald N. Thiele [Thiele, 1895] . We briefly review some axiomatic and computational properties of those rules and illustrate their differences with the maximin support method. For an extensive treatment of Phragmén's and Thiele's rules and their properties, we refer to the survey by Janson [2016] .
Phragmén's Rules
Phragmén's methods can be described as load distribution methods. Every selected candidate induces one unit of load, and this load needs to be distributed among the voters that approve of that candidate. For example, if there are 6 voters approving candidate c and we decide to select this candidate for the committee, then one possible way of distributing the load would be to give a load of 1 6 to each of those voters. However, it is not required that the load is distributed evenly among the approvers: different approvers of c could be assigned different (non-negative) loads, as long as the loads associated with each selected candidate sum up to 1. The goal is to choose a committee W such that the load distribution is as balanced as possible. Different interpretations of balancedness lead to different optimization goals; the most relevant variant minimizes the maximal load of a voter.
In particular, max-Phragmén is the rule that returns winner sets corresponding to load distributions minimizing the maximal voter load. And seq-Phragmén is a sequential (greedy) version of max-Phragmén; it selects candidates iteratively, in each round adding a candidate to the committee such that the new maximal voter load is as small as possible.
Load Distributions
Given an election σ = (N, C, A, k) and a subset D ⊆ C of candidates, a load distribution for D given σ is a two-dimensional array ℓ = (ℓ i,c ) i∈N,c∈D satisfying 0 ≤ ℓ i,c ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and c ∈ D, ℓ i,c = 0 for all i ∈ N and c ∈ D \ A i , and i∈N ℓ i,c = 1 for all c ∈ D.
We let L σ,D denote the set of all load distributions for D given σ. For a load distribution ℓ ∈ L, the total load of voter i under ℓ, denoted ℓ i , is given by ℓ i = c∈D ℓ i,c . Note that i∈N ℓ i = |D| for all ℓ ∈ L σ,D .
Finally, a load distribution is called optimal for given σ and D if the maximal total voter load max i∈N ℓ i is as small as possible. L opt σ,D denotes the set of all optimal load distribution functions.
We are now going to establishing a close connection between load distributions and support distribution functions. 10 Lemma 1. Let σ = (N, C, A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election and D ⊆ C a subset of candidates. Then, the following statements hold.
For every support distribution function
.
2. For every load distribution ℓ ∈ L σ,D , there is a support distribution function f ℓ ∈ F σ,D such that
Proof. For a given a support distribution function f ∈ F σ,D , define the load distribution ℓ f ∈ L σ,D by setting ℓ f i,c = f (i,c) supp f (c) for each i ∈ N and c ∈ D. 11 It follows that the total load of a voter is upper bounded by 1 supp f (c * ) , where c * is a candidate with minimal support (we recall that c f (i, c) = 1 for each voter i such that A i ∩ D = ∅).
For a given load distribution ℓ ∈ L σ,D , define a support distribution function f ℓ ∈ F σ,D by setting f ℓ (i, c) = ℓ i,c ℓ i for each voter i ∈ N such that 10 Throughout this section we assume that each candidate in D is approved by some voter in N ; otherwise, load distributions cannot be defined.
11 If for some candidate c it is supp f (c) = 0 the first part of the lemma trivially holds.
ℓ i > 0. That is, the support for a candidate is proportional to the load received from that candidate, scaled such that the total support by the voter is 1. It follows that the minimal support of a candidate is lower bounded by 1 ℓ i * , where i * is a voter with maximal load. To see this, let i * denote a voter with maximal load and let c ∈ D. Then,
Phragmén's Optimal Rule
Lemma 1 has particularly interesting implications for load distributions and support distribution functions that are optimal: The construction used in the proof of Lemma 1 establishes a one-to-one relationship between elements of L opt σ,D and elements of F opt σ,D . Therefore, the objective of minimizing the maximal voter load is equivalent to the objective of maximizing the minimal support. As a consequence, max-Phragmén (the method that globally minimizes the maximal voter load) is identical to the rule that globally maximizes the minimal support. 12
Theorem 7. Let σ = (N, C, A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election. Then, max-Phragmén(σ) = arg max W ⊆C,|W |=k maximin(σ, W ).
Since it is NP-hard to compute winners under max-Phragmén , the same is true for finding a set of candidates maximizing the maximin support. proved that max-Phragmén satisfies PJR (when combined with an appropriate tie-breaking rule) but not EJR. With respect to monotonicity axioms, Mora and Oliver [2015] proved that max-Phragmén fails house monotononicity and Sánchez-Fernández and Fisteus [2017] have recently extended previous results by Phragmén [1896] showing that max-Phragmén satisfies weak support monotonicity but fails strong support monotonicity.
Phragmén's Sequential Rule
There is also a close relationship between the maximin support method (MMS ) and Phragmén's sequential rule (seq-Phragmén). Both MMS and seq-Phragmén construct the set of winners by iteratively adding candidates:
MMS chooses candidates such that the minimal support of the new set is maximized; seq-Phragmén chooses candidates such that the maximal voter load incurred by the new set is minimized. However, there is a subtle difference between the two methods concerning the redistribution of support/load. Under MMS , support distributed to candidates in earlier rounds can be freely redistributed when looking for maximin support distributions for the new set of candidates. This is not the case for the loads under seq-Phragmén, however: once a voter is assigned some load from some candidate, this load is "frozen" and will always stay with the voter. As a consequence, the two methods might give different results.
Example 5. Consider again the approval-based multiwinner election σ 4 from Example 4. We recall that MMS (σ 4 ) = {c 1 , a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. In contrast, it can be easily shown that seq-Phragmén selects (in this order) {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , a 1 }.
It is straightforward to check that seq-Phragmén can be computed in polynomial time. With respect to the axiomatic properties considered in this paper, seq-Phragmén is indistinguishable from the maximin support method: seq-Phragmén satisfies house monotonicity by definition; it satisfies PJR but fails EJR ; and results by Phragmén [1896] , Mora and Oliver [2015] , and Janson [2016] imply that seq-Phragmén satisfies weak support monotonicity but violates strong support monotonicity.
Thiele's Rules
Thiele's rules are based on a score optimization problem [Thiele, 1895] . For a given approval-based multiwinner election σ = (N, C, A, k), the goal is to find a winner set W with |W | = k maximizing s(W ) = i∈N s(i, W ), where s(i, W ) is defined by s(i, W ) = |A i ∩W | j=1 1 j . Thiele [1895] proved that his methods are extensions of the D'Hondt method (see also [Janson, 2016; Brill et al., 2018] ).
Thiele's optimal rule, often referred to as Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) [Kilgour, 2010] , outputs a set W maximizing s(W ). This rule satisfies EJR (and thus PJR) [Aziz et al., 2017] and is NP-hard to compute [Aziz et al., 2015; Skowron et al., 2016] . It was already known by Thiele [1895] that PAV fails house monotonicity. proved that PAV satisfies strong support monotonicity with population increase (in fact, PAV is the only rule that is known to satisfy this axiom and EJR or PJR) but only weak support monotonicity without population increase.
Thiele's sequential rule (sometimes referred to as Reweighted Approval Voting (RAV), sequential PAV, or Thiele's addition method ), is a greedy heuristic for the score optimization problem defined above. The rule starts with W = ∅ and iteratively adds candidates c maximizing the score s(W ∪ {c}). It is straightforward to show that Thiele's sequential rule can be computed in polynomial time. The rule satisfies house monotonicity by definition. Furthermore, it satisfies weak support monotonicity but not strong support monotonicity , and it fails PJR [Aziz et al., 2017] . 13
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D'Hondt method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The principle on which this voting rule is based is that the support of the least supported winner should be maximized.
We have established that the maximin support method can be computed efficiently and satisfies a number of appealing axiomatic properties, including house monotonicity, weak support monotonicity, and proportional justified representation. We have also shown that the rule admits two equivalent formulations: in each iteration, selecting the candidate with the highest support (using an optimal support distribution function) is equivalent to selecting the candidate that maximizes the support of the least supported candidate. This can be seen as selecting, at the same time, the "best" candidate and the "best" set of candidates (from those that can be obtained by adding a new candidate to the set of previously chosen winners). We believe that this is a nice feature of the maximin support method.
We have also established a close relationship between the maximin support method and Phragmén's rules. This novel connection allows us to formulate Phragmén's optimal rule as a support maximization (rather than a load minimization) problem, and to view the maximin support method as a tractable approximation of Phragmén's (intractable) optimal rule. It would be very interesting to further illuminate the differences between the maximin support method and Phragmén's sequential rule.
Other possible lines of future work include axiomatic characterizations of the maximin support method (and other approval-based multiwinner rules), as well as the development of extensions to the ranked ballot setting.
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We first prove a lemma that relates maximin support values of different sets. In particular, it states that candidates receiving more then the minimal support (under an optimal support distribution function) can be removed without affecting the maximin value of the set.
Lemma 2. Let σ = (N, C, A, k) be an approval-based multiwinner election, D ⊆ C a nonempty subset of candidates, and f ∈ F opt σ,D an optimal support distribution function. If there exists a candidateĉ ∈ D such that supp f (ĉ) > maximin(σ, D), then maximin(σ, D) = maximin(σ, D \ {ĉ}).
Proof. It is easy to verify that maximin(σ, D) ≤ maximin(σ, D \ {ĉ}). We will now show that maximin(σ, D) ≥ maximin(σ, D \ {ĉ}) also holds.
Consider the primal and dual linear programs corresponding to the computation of maximin(σ, D) together with optimal solutions (s * , f * ) and (y * , z * ), where f * = f and s * = maximin(σ, D). Since supp f (c) > maximin(σ, D) holds by assumption, (7) implies that y * c = 0. Furthermore, if there exist voters i ∈ N with A i ∩ D = {ĉ}, then z * i = 0 for all such voters (because variable z i only appears in the single constraint z i ≥ yĉ). And the objective function value of the solution (ŷ,ẑ) is equal to that of the solution (y * , z * ) in the original dual because i∈N :
It follows that the objective function value of the dual linear program for D \ {ĉ} is less than or equal to the objective function value s * of the dual linear program for D. 14 In other words, maximin(σ, D \ {ĉ}) ≤ s * = maximin(σ, D).
14 Recall that the duals are minimization problems.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1.
Let W j denote the set of the first j candidates chosen by the maximin support method when applied to σ. Then, for each candidate c ∈ C \ W j and for each optimal support distribution function f c ∈ F opt σ,(W j ∪{c}) , supp fc (c) = maximin(σ, W j ∪ {c}).
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction on j. For j = 0, the statement clearly holds because W 0 ∪ {c} = {c} and there is a unique optimal support distribution function f c ∈ F opt σ,{c} that furthermore satisfies supp fc (c) = maximin(σ, {c}).
For the inductive step, let us assume that the statement holds for j = m. We show that it also holds for j = m + 1.
Suppose for contradiction that this is not the case. Then, there exist a candidate c ∈ C − W m+1 and an optimal support distribution function f c ∈ F opt σ,W m+1 ∪{c} such that supp fc (c) > maximin(σ, W m+1 ∪ {c}).
By Lemma 2, this implies that maximin(σ, W m+1 ∪ {c}) = maximin(σ, W m+1 ).
Let c m+1 be the (m+1)st candidate chosen by MMS for election σ. Thus, W m+1 = W m ∪{c m+1 }. Let g be a support distribution function on W m ∪{c} such that supp g (c ′ ) ≥ supp fc (c ′ ) for all c ′ in W m ∪ {c}.
Such a function can easily be constructed by considering f c and redistributing support that is assigned to candidate c m+1 . We now distinguish two cases: either the function g maximizes the support for the least supported candidate in W m ∪ {c}, or it does not.
Case 1 g ∈ F opt σ,W m ∪{c} . In this case,
and thus, by the induction hypothesis, maximin(σ, W m ∪ {c}) = supp g (c).
By combining (8), (9), (10), and (12), we have maximin(σ, W m ∪ {c}) = supp g (c) ≥ supp fc (c) > maximin(σ, W m+1 ∪ {c}) = maximin(σ, W m ∪ {c m+1 }).
However, this is a contradiction because it implies that candidate c should have been selected instead of c m+1 at iteration (m + 1).
Case 2 g ∈ F σ,W m ∪{c} \ F opt σ,W m ∪{c} . In this case,
Furthermore, since f c ∈ F opt σ,W m+1 ∪{c} , we have min c ′ ∈(W m+1 ∪{c}) supp fc (c ′ ) = maximin(σ, W m+1 ∪ {c}).
By combining (9), (10), (13) and (14) Again, this is a contradiction because it implies that candidate c should have been selected instead of c m+1 at iteration (m + 1).
